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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE P. JONES,
Petitioner/Appellant/
v.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of
Driver License Services,
:
Department of Public Safety,
for the State of Utah,
:
Defendant Respondent.

Case No. 20635

: ..

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of driver license revocation issued by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On June 5, 1984 before the Driver License Division of the
Department of Public Safety, a hearing was held pursuant to
the provisions of Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended
1983).

Bruce P. Jones, appellant in the instant action, filed

a timely request to subsection (2) of that statute for a trial
de novo in the District Court of his county of residence, Salt
Lake County.

On February 19, 1985 trial de novo was held to

determine whether Mr. Jones1 driver's license should be revoked
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for violation of Utah implied consent statute.

Subsequently,

the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding, ordered that
Mr* Jones1 petition be denied and his driver's license be
revoked pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended
1983).

Notice of Appeal was filed on April 19f 1985, within 30

days of the final order of the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court Order
revoking his driver's license and an order remanding this case
back to the District Court with instruction to order reinstatement of Mr. Jones' driving privileges.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue presented on appeal is whether the District
Court erred in ruling that Mr. Jones was properly requested to
submit to a chemical test pursuant to §41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno,
(amended 198 3).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 9, 1984, Bruce P. Jones was stopped by Utah High
way Patrol Trooper Lynn Richardson and detained as a suspect in
an alleged burglary. R.4.

Subsequently, Officer Chris Nielson of

Nephi Police Department responded to a back-up call and placed
Mr. Jones under arrest for burglary.

R.7.

Officer Nielson did

not see Mr. Jones operate a vehicle R. 12, 23-24.

Mr. Jones

was subsequently rearrested by Officer Nielson, this time for

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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driving under the influence, and requested to take a chemical
test pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Anno, (amended 1983).
R.13-14.

Following his refusal to take the test, Officer Nielson

interviewed Mr. Jones in accordance with the standard alcohol
influence report form R.13-14.

At the de novo hearing, the Court,

over Mr. Jones1 objection, also admitted as evidence statements
made by Mr. Jones to Officer Nielson after the refusal had occured.
R. 18-20,21,27.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant will argue that since the arresting officer
did not observe any operation or physical control of a vehicle
on the part Mr. Jones, there existed no grounds to believe him
to be in violation of Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Anno, (amended
1983), and therefore the request to submit to a chemical test
was improper.
Further, the Court erred in admitting and considering as
evidence the contents of the DUI report form which contained
statements made by Mr. Jones after the officer deemed the refusal
to have occurred.
ARGUMENT
The Utah implied consent statute [§41-6-44.10 Utah Code
Anno, (amended 1983)] states in pertinent part:
-3-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the
purpose of determining whether he was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug as detailed in
section 41-6-44, so long as the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having
grounds to believe that person to have been driving or
i.n actual physical control of a motor vehicle
[emphas
1
added].
This Court has determined that the grounds which exist must be
"reasonable" grounds based upon facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy
information, Ballard v. State of Utah, Motor Vehicle Division, 59 5
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979).

Furthermore, this Court has held that it i

incumbent upon the Department of Public Safety to show evidence
of driving or actual physical control in addition to showing that
the arresting officer had grounds to believe the individual was
under the influence.
1982).

Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah

The Garcia decision acknowledges "two separate burdens to

be borne by the Department".

64 5 P.2d 6 52.

In the instant case, the record reveals no admissable
evidence of driving upon which to base Officer Nielsonfs request
for a chemical test.

Officer Nielson clearly testifed that he

did not see Mr. Jones drive.

1.

Nor did Trooper Richardson or any

The cited statutes are presented in the form effective as
of April 9, 1984.
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other witness appear to testify that Mr. Jones was driving an
automobile.
Moreover, Mr. Jones was initially arrested by Trooper
Richardson not for driving under the influence, but upon suspicion
of burglary.

It is an extension of the old common law requirement

on warrantless arrests as a general rule that misdemeanors neces2
sarily be committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
The rule was partly excepted to include warrantless arrests for
driving under the influence when an accident is involved, as
codified in §41-6-44(8) Utah Code Anno, (amended 1933).

That

portion of the statute has recently been modified to broaden the
exception.

3

It is clear that the legislature recognized that driving
under the influence arrests were to be made by an officer who
witnessed the offense.

By carving out a statutory exception, this

requirement is prospectively eliminated.

However, Officer Nielson

did not have the benefit of H.B. 193 on April 9, 1984.

2.

§77-7-2 Utah Code Anno, (amended 1985).

3.

H.B. 19 3 has amended subsection 8 to read: A peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe
the violation has occurred, although not in his presence, and
if the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
was committed by the person.
-5-
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By the same token, the officer did not have the benefit
of Mr. Jones responses to sections 10 and 11 of the DUI report form
at the time the request and refusal took place.

The Court erred

in admitting the statements of Mr. Jones made after the refusal,
since they could not have been used to formulate the grounds for
offering the chemical test.

As the Ballard case requires, the

officer cannot offer a chemical test unless
11

[r] easonable grounds exist where the facts and circumstance sjd±hi£i_the^
and of which he
had reasonably trustworthy information and sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the situation exists". [emphasis added]
595 P.2d at 1306.
It is clear that at the time the chemical test was offered and deemed
4
refused, the "situation11 described in Ballard did not exist.
The admission of the DUI report form itself was prejudicial
and the Court erred in admitting it.

5

While the record is not

clear as to how much Officer Nielson relied on his report during

4.

At the time of the Officer's request to take a chemical test,
no driving, either observed or admitted, had occurred. See
Dayhoff v. Colorado Motor Vehicle Division. 595 P.2d 1051
(Colo. 1979).

5.

If the report is deemed to be a past recollection recorded
under Utah Rules of Evidence 803(5), the document itself is
not admissable. Contra.. Sagers v. International Smelting Co.
50 Utah 423, 168 P.105 (1917). Other jurisdictions hold that"
the contents of the writing are admissable only when the witness
has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately. Elam v. Soares, 577 P.2d 1336 (Oregon 1978).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testimony, there is no record that he had no independent recollection of the events testified to.

Therefore, admission of the report

or its contents was error.
This error is made significant in light of the fact that
the Court used this report in arriving at its oral ruling from the
bench.
It is herein asserted that Officer Nielson lacked probable
cause for the driving under the influence arrest of Bruce P. Jones,
and that no reasonable ground existed upon which to request a
chemical test in conformity with §41-6-66.10(1) Utah Code Anno,
(amended 198 3).

The District Court erred in ordering the revocation

of Mr. Jones1 license.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons as stated above, the appellant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the District Court
and remand the case back with instructions that appellant's petition
be granted and his driver license be reinstated.
DATED this

/->

day of October, 1985.
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1

•STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY

Attorney for Appellant/petitioner
/
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ADDENDUM
Applicable Statutory Provisions
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U.C.A. 41-6-44 (8)
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person for a violation of this section when the violation
is coupled with an accident or collision in which the person is involved and when the violation has, in fact, been
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer
has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was
committed by the person.

U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1)
Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the
purpose of determining whether he was drivina or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under
the influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, so long
as the test is or tests are administered at the direction
of a peace office having grounds to believe that person
to have been driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combinations of alcohol and any drug
as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall
determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered.
No person who has been requested under this section
to submit to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood,
or urine, shall have' the right to select the test tests
to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace
officer to arrange for any specific test requested by a
peace officer and it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
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U.C.A. 77-7-2
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted
in his presence,
(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe a
felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) When he has reasonable cause to believe the
person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid arrestlb) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) Injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.
Utah Rules of Evidence 803 (5)
(5)

m

Recorded Recollection.

A memorandum or record concernina a matter about which
a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shov/n
to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter
was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was delivered to
Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 124 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125, on this <DJ7?r

day of October,

1985.
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